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ABSTRACT
 
The present study examined the effects of background
 
or contextual variables on human social causal judgements.
 
Modern conditioning and attribution research principles were
 
combined to investigate social analogues of acquisition and
 
blocking of causal judgements. As part of the masking task,
 
subjects were asked to play the role of a supervisor and
 
evaluate the efficacy of an employee evaluation system.
 
Fictional worker(s) and a company's production goals were
 
presented to subjects to evaluate the workers'
 
effectiveness in causing the company's level of production.
 
A simple repeated measures analysis were performed on the
 
worker causal ratings, and acquisition effects were not
 
found; however, a familiar acquisition function was revealed
 
when it was discovered that subjects were responding to the
 
varying levels of the company's production. A 3 X 6
 
Manova performed on the target worker's causal ratings did
 
not evidence blocking. Alternative explanations for the
 
unanticipated findings, and implications for further
 
research were discussed. Heuristically, this study enhances
 
attribution research such that the basic psychological
 
processes involved in clinical judgement may be compared and
 
understood in a contextual situation with those involved in
 
everyday social judgement.
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INTRODUCTION
 
One purposeful way that people make sense out
 
of the world is through identifying causal connections and
 
by making causal judgements. Events, changes in state,
 
and changes in properties are all explained and thus
 
understood by attribution to their respective causes.
 
The concept of causation is just as fundamental to
 
human understanding as are concepts of object, space,
 
time, quantity, and logic. Perhaps this may be the
 
reason why many Western philosophers have dealt in a
 
systematic way with the ontological and epistemological
 
aspects of causation.
 
Western ideologies have generally influenced
 
contemporary thinking on causation and this influence has
 
contributed to the development of an area of research and
 
theory in social psychology known as attribution theory
 
(Bunge, 1979; Duval, 1983; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986;
 
Hewstone, 1989; Schulz, 1982). Of monumental interest in the
 
movement of Western philosophical thinking was a period in
 
the seventeenth century dominated by the British
 
Associationists. The British Associationists viewed human
 
knowledge as a product of impressions processed through our
 
senses. Simple ideas were viewed as irreducible elements of
 
sensory experience, and complex ideas were thought to be
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built up from simple ideas by a series of learned
 
associations. For example, David Hume's (1962/1739)
 
Treatise of Human Nature, suggested that associative
 
learning and causal judgements depended upon a
 
deterministic process. He developed several rules for
 
causal association: 1) spatiotemporal contiauitv. or causes
 
and effects must be contiguous in space and time; 2)
 
temporal priority, or causes must occur prior to their
 
effects; and 3) constant union, or causes and effects must
 
occur together.
 
Another British Associationist, John Stuart Mill
 
(1872/1973), suggested from his System of Logic that causes
 
"...are the sum total of conditions positive and negative
 
taken together....which being realized, the consequence in
 
variably follows" (Davidson, 1967, pg. 692.) Mill argued
 
that what people ordina:rily call the cause is one of these
 
conditions, arbitrarily selected, which becomes inaccurately
 
labelled as "the cause."
 
Although attribution theory has been defined as
 
the study of perceived causation where attribution
 
refers to the perception or inference of cause (Kelley
 
& Michela, 1980), several researchers have suggested
 
that "attribution theory" is actually a loose term
 
standing for a general perspective and/or problem
 
rather than a theory (Buss, 1978; Medcof, 1990; Medcof,
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Kelley & Michela, 1980). Moreover, attributional
 
conoepts are at the center of contemporary cognitive
 
psychology and have been a major target of critical
 
analyses (Harvey & Weary, 1981). The present research
 
seeks to develop and test a conditioning model which
 
extends research on causal attribution by employing a
 
research approach which Neal Miller (1959) called an
 
"extension of liberalized S-R lea:rning theory".
 
Utilizing the Rescorla-Wagner model (1972), I
 
tested several novel predictions from Rescorla and
 
Wagner•s theory. More specifically, as part of a
 
larger program of learning research, I
 
examined acquisition effects and a phenomenon called
 
"blocking" (Kamin, 1968; 1969). Results from the
 
present research can be used to demonstrate that in
 
accordance with contemporary psychological thinking,
 
including both learning theories (e.g. Rescorla-

Wagner, 1972) and cognitive social theories (e.g. Jones
 
& Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1973), causal judgements reflect
 
a predictable selective mechanism. From a broader
 
perspective, the present study can serve as a heuristic
 
device to generate additional hypotheses and
 
experimental studies pertaining to context effects in
 
human causal judgement.
 
CONTEMPORARY CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION RESEARCH
 
Theoretical and empirical research on attributional
 
processes have been a major focus of research in social
 
psychology. In fact, Kelley and Michela (1980) reported over
 
900 publications relevant to attributional processes between
 
1970 and 1980. Harvey and Weary (1984) found another 400 to
 
500 relevant papers published between 1978 to 1984.
 
Perhaps one of the many reasons why social psychologists
 
examine this area of research is that attributional
 
processes are closely connected to other social
 
psychological phenomena. For example, our understanding of
 
the causes of behavior are crucial mediators of our actions
 
in the social world. Moreover, our reactions to other
 
people, like altruism, attraction and conformity, depend on
 
our judgements of the causes underlying another person's
 
behavior.
 
Regularitv vs Generative Theory. It can be said that
 
the development and construction of theory is built upon a
 
historical background in methodology and philosophy. Two
 
opposing positions have risen in the treatment of causation.
 
First, regularity-based theories (like Kelley's covariation
 
model and associative learning models) of causation follow
 
from the philosophical principles of logical positivism
 
(Nagel, 1961). Originally, the regularity view of causation
 
was influenced by the work of Hume (1739/1960), who argued
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that human observers chnnot in principle validate the
 
existence of real causal connections, but only observe the
 
repetitive, regular occurrences of independent events. Hume
 
maintained that observers interpret phenomena in terms of
 
one event causing another to the extent that any or all of
 
three conditions occur (i.e. spatiotemporal contiguity,
 
temporal priority, and constant union). Contemporary
 
modifications of the regularity view emphasize notions of
 
necessary and sufficient conditions, and a conditionship
 
analysis of causal connections. This involves the
 
specification of an event occurring either under necessary
 
or sufficient conditions, or both, governing the
 
relationship of two eivents.
 
Generative theories, on the other hand, argue that
 
causes actually generate or produce the effect. An example
 
of a generative cause would be an automobile accident which
 
ultimately produces the effect. According to Schultz (1982),
 
generative theories originated from early Western
 
philosophers (i.e. Kant, 1781/1965), with psychological
 
research on causal inference and attribution being
 
primarily influehced by regularity-based theories.
 
And, the work proposed here follows a "regularity" based
 
position. Indeed, Einhbrn and Hogarth (1986) have argued a
 
similar case by stating that attribution theory researchers
 
have followed Kelley (1967) in emphasizing Mill's (1872)
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criti^ria of concomitant variation and method of difference.
 
The rule of "concomitant variation" argues that inferences
 
about the cause determining the effect are more probable
 
when other competing explanations are ruled out. And Mill's
 
"method of difference" states that if an effect is not
 
observed, then the cause will not be present.
 
Although research on attribution processes has
 
continued to grow over the last decade, it has been
 
argued that there still remains no well accepted set of
 
assumptions or hypotheses, nor general conclusions that fit
 
together in a logical network (Weary, Stanley, & Harvey,
 
1989). However, the vast majority of attribution studies
 
have developed from the theoretical perspectives of
 
researchers like Heider (1958), Jones and Davis (1965) and
 
Kelley (1967, 1973). The commonalities between these three
 
theories include the following themes: 1) mediation between
 
stimulus and response; 2) active and constructive causal
 
interpretation; 3) and the perspective of the naive
 
perceiver or lay person (Taylor, 1981). Interestingly, they
 
also share a concern with common-sense explanations and
 
answers to the perceiver•s questions about why events occur,
 
or about a person's dispositions. Since the major focus
 
of contemporary research has stemmed from Heider (1958),
 
Jones and Davis (1965) and Kelley (1967), a brief review of
 
their major contributions follows.
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Surprisingly, the first psychological study on
 
causality did not begin in social psychology, but developed
 
from the investigations of Jean Piaget and A. E. Michotte.
 
Piaget (1930) examined the origin of the idea of causality
 
in children and how children used causal language. Michotte
 
(1946), who was influenced by a Gestalt psychological
 
perspective, studied the perception of causality through the
 
movement and collision of geometrical shapes. Michotte
 
argued that it was possible to experience phenomenal
 
causality directly, but only if the perceiver's total
 
impression of causality was not dissected into pieces by the
 
investigator. This and similar ideas from the Gestalt
 
perspective influenced Fritz Heider's (1958, 1973) thinking
 
regarding causality in the field social psychology.
 
Fritz Heider "Dispositional Properties". Heider's
 
contributions to attribution theory include his study of the
 
processes and variables involved in how people make causal
 
attributions (Weary, Stanley, & Harvey, 1989). Initially,
 
Heider (1958) was curious about the processes by which an
 
untrained observer makes sense out of the actions of others.
 
He suggested that ordinary people operate like "naive
 
scientists" when making attributions. More specifically, he
 
argued that people observe an action and then, in an
 
analytical way, they attempt to find the connections among
 
various causes and effects. In searching for these
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connections, Heider applied the term "dispositional
 
properties" which dispose objects and events to manifest
 
themselves in certain ways and conditions. Heider further
 
believed that these dispositional properties are the
 
invariances which make for a more or less predictable,
 
stable, controllable world (Heider 1958, pg. 80).
 
Heider also suggested that people are not simply
 
content to register the observances surrounding them, but
 
they refer to the invariances in their environment. The
 
underlying causes of events (like the motives of other
 
people) are the invariances of the environment that
 
are relevant to the individual. This observation fostered
 
one of HeiderVs many theoretical statements: scientific
 
psychology could be studied from a common sense approach.
 
Put more simply, Heider's (1958) insights suggested an
 
analogy between naive causal analyses and experimental
 
methods because both presume a regularity in events
 
occurring in nature.
 
Heider (1958) suggested that a person's ability to
 
control the environment depends on the recognition of causal
 
relationships. In other words, to negotiate the external
 
world it is advantageous and even essential to understand
 
which specific events are causing what particular effects.
 
Similarly, Kelley (1973) stated that "causal attribution
 
identifies the causes of certain effects and forms the basis
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for decisions about how to act in order to bring about the
 
continuance or discontinuance of those effects [p. 127]."
 
Notions of personal control and responsibility for outcomes
 
are closely related to the philosophical ideologies of both
 
critical realists (Harre, 1972) and contemporary learning
 
theorists (Garcia, 1968; Seligman, 1970). For example, the
 
critical realists view looking for causes (i.e., invariance
 
seeking action) as biolbgically adaptive and therefore may
 
be a part of human genetic makeup. Some learning theorists
 
support a similar notion in terms of an innate biological
 
mechanism located in the organism's central nervous system
 
which functions in the promotion of specific associations
 
biologically relevant to the organism's survival (AKA innate
 
releasing mechanisms). It may be possible that humans are
 
biologically or perhaps socio-logically prepared to
 
associate certain causes and certain effects more readily
 
than others (See Kuhn, 1993). While Heider (1958)
 
acknowledged that "intentionality" was important to the
 
understanding of personal causation, Jones and Davis (1965)
 
extended this concept by attempting to formalize how
 
individuals make inferences about a person's intentions and,
 
in turn, dispositions.
 
Jones and Davis "Gorrespondent Inference". Jones and
 
Davis (1965) developed a hypothesis-testing theory known as
 
"Correspondent Inference". Basically, their theory is
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concerned with factors that influence an observer's
 
attribution of intent and disposition to another person.
 
However, it does not explain how someone understands
 
his/her own dispositions and intentions (Weary, Stanley, &
 
Harvey, 1989).
 
Jones and Davis describe a correspondent inference as
 
ah inference about an individual's intentions and
 
dispositions that directly results from or corresponds to
 
his/her behaviors. For example. Professor Kenny makes a
 
sarcastic remark to one of his students named Fredrika,
 
leading to some emotional discomfort on her part. We may
 
infer that Professor Kenny is hostile toward Fredrika and
 
intends to abuse her verbally. In this example, the
 
perceiVer's attribution of Professor Kenny's intent follows
 
directly from his behavior;. Extending from their original
 
hypothesis (Cprrespondent Inference), Jones and Davis
 
analyzed seyeral factors which may influence the perceiver's
 
inference. They wanted to know what factors would facilitate
 
a perceiver's attribution regarding Professor Kenny's
 
intent. More spepifically, was the Professor's sarcastic
 
remark hostile pr was no ill will actually intended? A
 
partial explanation provided by Jones and Davis is that the
 
socio^cultural desirabilitv of the viewed behavior is an
 
important determinant of the perceiver's attributions of
 
intent and disposition. According tP this view, behavior
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that is unexpected, or low in desirability, will be more
 
informative to the perceiver and more conducive to a
 
dispositional inference, than behavior that is expected or
 
high in desirability. For example, most societies have
 
underlying social norms, and negative behavior (i.e.,
 
behavior contrary to the societal norm) is more informative
 
about the individual than is behavior which is positive or
 
conforms to the norm.
 
Another determinant of a correspondent inference is
 
non-common effects. According to Jones and Davis (1965),
 
information about the consequences of alternative actions is
 
used to infer the intention behind a particular act. The
 
principle behind non-common effects is that the intention
 
underlying a voluntary act is more clearly evident when it
 
has a small number of effects that are unique to it (i.e.,
 
non-common). In other words, non-common effects represent
 
distinctive outcomes that follow from an act. In the
 
previous example, let's say a student named Fredrika is a
 
member of a serious group of students studying in the field
 
of archaeology. On several occasions this group has attended
 
many professional conventions and has participated in
 
several archaeological excavations. Thus, it could be
 
said that the group's activities are "common effects".
 
However, When the supervising Professor (Dr. Kenny) asked
 
his students (including Fredrika) to attend a very important
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expedition in South America, everyone except Fredrika
 
accepts the invitation. Thus, Fredrika's decision not to go
 
is a non-common effect, relative to the group's decision,
 
since in the past all of Professor Kenny's students have
 
Participated in these types of activities. The observers of
 
Fredrika's behavior are more likely to make an dispositional
 
inference regarding her decision. They might infer that
 
Fredrika is not a dedicated student (dispositional
 
attribution), when in fact there may be situational factors
 
present (e. g., family matters). Jones and Davis argued that
 
non-common effects associated with an act, lead to a greater
 
likelihood of a dispositional attribution.
 
Kellev "Covariation Principle". Unlike Jones and
 
Davis, Kelley's (1967,1972,1973) research investigated how
 
people make attributions to others and the self. Kelley
 
argued that his theory applies egually well to
 
iself-perception as it does to person perception. Extending
 
Heider's original thesis that casual judgements can be
 
examined via the experimental method, Kelley theorized that
 
people make causal attributions as if they were analyzing
 
data patterns by means of an analysis of variance (ANOVA).
 
Thus, Kelley followed Heider (1944) in the use of a version
 
of J. S. Mill's "method of difference": i.e., an effect is
 
attributed to a condition that is present when the effect is
 
present, and absent when the effect is absent. This, Kelley
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argued, was the underlying logic of his covariation
 
principle which fundaiftentally operates in his attributional
 
ANOVA model (HewstoneV 1983). Recall earlier that Hume's
 
third rule on constant union states that causes and effects
 
must occur together. It is interesting to note the
 
similarity between Hume's rule and Kelley's covariation
 
principle that "an effect is attributed to the one of its
 
possible causes with which, over time, it covaries"
 
(Kelley, 1973, p.109).
 
Kelley's initial interest in attribution was to address
 
the question of what information is used in arriving at
 
casual attributions. Kelley outlined two different
 
attributional situations depending on the amount of
 
information given to the perceiver. He called these two
 
cases covariation and configuration. Under covariation, the
 
perceiver has information frOm multiple sources and can
 
perceive the covariation of an observed effect and its
 
possible cause. The classes of possible causes are persons,
 
entities (environmental stimuli) and times (occasions or
 
situations). According to Kelley, attributors use three
 
types of information to verify cause and effect relation
 
ships. The three types of information: distinctiveness.
 
consistency and consensus.
 
Utilizing the previous example, lets' say Professor
 
Kenny laughs at a former colleague. Observers, according to
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KelleyVs Anova model, would make an attribution based upon
 
the information with which it covaries. Presumably, this
 
outcome could be caused by something about the person
 
(Professor Kenny), the stimulus (former colleague), the
 
circumstance (the occasion on which the outcome occurred),
 
or a combination of these factors. Kelley's model suggested
 
that observers use three possible ways to examine
 
variations in effects: 1) over people - do other Professors
 
as a group laugh at this colleague? (consensus information);
 
2) over stimuli - does Professor Kenny laugh at other
 
colleagues? (distinctiveness information); 3) over time ­
has Professor Kenny laughed at the same colleague in the
 
past? (consistency information). The covariation principle
 
would suggest that: if only Professor Kenny laughs at the
 
colleague (low consensus), if he also laughs at other
 
colleagues (low distihctiveness), and if he has laughed at
 
this colleague in the past (high consistency), the effect
 
will be attributed to something about the person (Professor
 
Kenny).
 
Configuration, on the other hand, pertains to the idea
 
that a perceiver must take into account the "configuration"
 
of factors leading to an observed effect. In other words, if
 
the perceiver lacks critical information when multiple
 
causes are present, the perceiver will make attributions
 
based on "causal schemata." Kelley argued that these
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schemata were built up from experience about how certain
 
types of Causes interact to produce specific types of
 
effects.
 
Kelley outlined two types of causal schemata from
 
which other schemas could be generated. These include
 
multiple sufficient cause (MSG) schema and multiple
 
necessary cause (MNC) schema. Kelley's MSG schema assumes
 
that different causes (e.g., adverse home background, poor
 
school environment and lack of individual effort) produce
 
the same effect (e. g., exam failure). The operation of
 
this schema has been observed in studies demonstrating the
 
"discounting principle"; given that different causes produce
 
the same effect, the role of a given cause (e.g., lack of
 
effort) in producing the effect (failure) is attenuated if
 
other plausible causes are present (e.g., problems at home)
 
(Kelley, 1972).
 
Kelley argued that causes can be inhibitory or
 
facilitative to an effect. For example, to succeed in
 
an exam, problems at home would be seen as an inhibiting
 
cause. In this case the "augmenting principle" might be
 
applied. According to the augmenting principle, the role of
 
certain causes (e.g., individual effort) is augmented when
 
the presence of another cause (e.g., hoitie problems) would be
 
seen to inhibit the effect. Thus, an individual who has home
 
problems and succeeds on an exam may have success attributed
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more to internal factors (such as effort) than would a
 
student who does not have home problems. Kelley has not
 
explained the details of how and when schemata are used.
 
However, the most common assumption is that lay people make
 
attributions as if they were using schemata to meet the need
 
for a fast, economical analysis (Hewstone, 1983).
 
The present study will investigate causal judgements
 
using contemporary learning theory as a guide. Since
 
behavior patterns are presumably governed by less
 
complicated mechanisms, the knowledge gained from the
 
investigation of elementary processes (e.g. classical
 
conditioning) can be used to guide the study of more complex
 
behavior systems. Therefore, a brief examination of relevant
 
learning theory and its application towards social causal
 
judgements follows.
 
LEARNING THEORY
 
Like attribution researchers early traditional learning
 
theorists were greatly influenced by the ideas and
 
philosophies of the British Associationists (e.g., Hume,
 
Locke, Bacon). For example, the mechanisms by which
 
associations develop in Pavlovian conditioning were thought
 
to occur by the simple pairing or contiguity of antecedent
 
and consequent stimuli (Rescorla, 1988). This historical
 
idea in classical conditioning is reminiscent of Hume's
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third rule on causality and is conceptually similar to
 
Kelley's covariation principle. It is in this ideological
 
framework that attributional judgements may be related to or
 
follow from associations.
 
Pavlov's "Overshadowing". Pavlov's work in classical
 
conditioning demonstrated that organisms could learn to make
 
new responses to stimuli and learn about the relations
 
between stimuli. More specifically, the essential features
 
of classical conditioning is a paradigm where an
 
unconditioned stimulus (US) which reliably produces a
 
measurable unconditioned response (UR) is paired with a
 
neutral or conditioned stimulus (GS). As a function of
 
repeated pairings the OS eventually elicits a response in
 
the absence of the US. This response is called a conditioned
 
response (OR). Pavlov described and explained several
 
conditioning phenomena like acquisition and extinction
 
(Schwartz, 1989). However, of particular importance in the
 
development of contemporary thinking in Pavlovian
 
conditioning, was a learning phenomena discovered by Pavlov
 
called overshadowing and inhibition (Mackintosh, 1974;
 
Rescorla, 1971; Schwartz, 1989).
 
Pavlov's overshadowing phenomena demonstrated that the
 
strength of conditioning to one stimulus depended upon
 
whether it was presented alone or in a stimulus compound.
 
When a compound CS consisting of thermal and tactile stimuli
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was paired with a US and subjects were tested using each
 
component in isolation, only the more intense CS would
 
elicit the stronger CR's. Hence, Pavloy concluded that the
 
stronger of the two component stimuli would "overshadow" the
 
weaker to a greater or lesser extent dependent on the
 
relative intensities of the two stimuli (Macintosh, 1974).
 
The implications of overshadowing suggested that the
 
principles of simple contiguity failed to explain this
 
conditioning. If simple contiguity was necessary and
 
sufficient for conditioning to occur, than each CS (the more
 
and less intense) in the compound would have conditioned
 
equally. Although this phenomena was not thoroughly
 
investigated until much later (Kamin, 1968; Wagner, Logan,
 
Haberlandt, & Price, 1968), it began a new era in learning
 
theory by initiating inquiry into the nature of selective
 
association.
 
Kamin's "Blocking". Support for the general
 
overshadowing effect based on prior experience (blocking)
 
comes from a series of studies by Kamin (1968). Kamin's
 
blocking experiment showed that conditioning of CS (A) with
 
a particular US to asymptote attenuates or blocks the
 
ability of the US to produce conditioning to a new CS (X)
 
when it is introduced to the conditioning situation. In
 
demonstrating the "blocking effect". Kamin (1968, 1969)
 
developed a three phase experimental sequence using a
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conditioned suppression procedure in rats. During phase ohe,
 
stimulus (A) is paired with the US in the experimental group
 
while a control group receives no single stimulus
 
conditioning. During phase two the experimental and control
 
group receive conditioning trials in which stimulus (A) is
 
presented in a compound with (X) and paired with the US
 
(AX+). A subsequent test of response strength to stimulus
 
(X) alone indicates that less conditioning occurs to
 
stimulus (X) in the experimehtal group than in the control
 
group. Arguably/ conditioning to (X) was blocked in the
 
experimental group because prior conditioning to (A) reached
 
asymptote thus allowihg the US to become ineffective and
 
therefore no new coriditioning to (X) could occur.
 
Overshadowing and blocking effects suggest that a
 
simple CS-US contiguity mechanism fails to capture
 
adequately the relation required to produce an association.
 
Consider for example a real life event. A man goes to a
 
restaurant eats a meal and gets sick. Ih this situation
 
there are numerous cues most of which fall within the
 
boundaries of temporal contiguity with the effect and could
 
serve as the CS for the man's illness. The plate on which
 
the food was served, the waitress, the background music,
 
could all serve as potential CSs since these stimuli are
 
within the temporal limits necessary for successful
 
Pavlovian conditioning. The question is how, or by what
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criteria the organism selects one of the stimuli as the CS
 
over other potential cues? This question falls within a
 
general class of problems termed stimulus selection. Rudy
 
and Wagner (1975) describe the stimulus selection problem as
 
"one of specifying the rules whereby a relationship will or
 
will not appear to be learned about depending upon the
 
context of environmental events in which it is embedded (p.
 
270)
 
Rescorla-Waqner's "Stimulus selection Problem". In an
 
attempt to address the stimulus selection problem, Rescorla
 
and Wagner (1972) proposed that organisms behave as if they
 
estimate the information embedded in the different stimuli
 
with respect to the probabilities of the US appearance.
 
Theoretically, organisms form selective associations between
 
the US and the stimulus which contains the maximum
 
information about possible occurrence of the US. More
 
specifically, stimuli that covary reliably in the past with
 
the US become better predictors of the US and would
 
therefore be selected: as the CS. Based on their predictions,
 
Rescorla and Wagner developed a mathematical model
 
(neo—Hullian) which assumes that the gain in learning on
 
each trial is dependent both on what has been conditioned
 
prior to that trial and the theoretical asymptote of
 
learning a US can support. Rescorla and Wagner's model Was
 
able to explain and predict Kamin's blocking effect by
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 arguing that the associative strengths of component stimuli
 
(A and X) change due to the net combination of the
 
components, not each component separately. In other words,
 
the more significant an effect (US) is on changing the
 
associative strength of a stimulus depends on the existing
 
strength of that stimulus and on other stimuli present. The
 
Rescorla-Wagner model will be presented again in more
 
detail.
 
SOCIAL LEARNING THEORY
 
The parallels between simple learning situations
 
previously mentioned and situations within the framework of
 
attribution theory should be apparent. Substitution of the
 
CS (or antecedent stimulus) and the US (or consequent
 
stimulus) by terms like persons and behaviors would produce
 
a typical attribution problem. Recall earlier that Kelley's
 
theoretical analysis of cause-effect judgements were based
 
on contiguity. However, when multiple causes are present
 
(multiple CSs) attribution theory offers explanations like
 
discounting and augmenting, but does not explain the
 
mechanisms governing which cause-effect judgements are made
 
given contextual variation. Initially, learning theory also
 
fell prey to the idea that cause-effect associations were a
 
product of contiguity. However, when compound CSs (or
 
multiple causes) were introduced in conditioning, learning
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theory advanced by proposing new models and theories to
 
explain and predict contextual variation in
 
stimulus-stimulus associations (e.g., Rescorla-Wagner
 
Model). Thus, it can be argued that the advances made in
 
contemporary learning theory can be applied to guide the
 
present research and to better understand attribution
 
processes.
 
Allov and Tabachnik. One of the many ideas from
 
Miller's (1959) approach that the proposed study adopts is
 
the view that basic learning processes found in the
 
laboratory can be applied to explain more complex social
 
phenomena. Consistent with this approach. Alloy and
 
Tabachnik (1984) proposed a theoretical framework for
 
understanding and integrating animal learning phenomena and
 
human covariation judgements. More specifically, they
 
postulated that animals as well as humans perceive event
 
contingencies and that judgements based on covariation are
 
an interactive process between prior expectations about
 
event relationships and current available situational
 
information. According to Alloy and Tabachnik, how an
 
organism makes judgements and/or modifies its behavior
 
depends upon relevant expectations and objective situational
 
information as well as on the degree to which these two
 
sources of information converge (see also Rescorla, 1988).
 
Shanks and Dickinson. SimilarIv. Shanks and Dickinson
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(1987) have suggested that empirical and theoretical
 
analyses of the impact of event contingencies developed
 
within animal conditioning may illuminate the processes
 
underlying human judgments of causality. They argued that
 
empirical similarities like acquisition functions,
 
contextual blocking and signaling effects found in animal
 
conditioning can be applied to the understanding of human
 
causality judgements. In particular, they suggest that an
 
associative view be applied to human causality judgements.
 
In demonstrating parallels between animal conditioning
 
and human causal judgements. Shanks and Dickinson (1987)
 
showed that when human subjects are given a task to judge
 
the relationship between an action and an outcome, their
 
judgements are sensitive to contingencies between the
 
probability of the outcome given the action P(0/A) and the
 
probability of the outcome given no action P(0/-A). For
 
example, previous research showed that acquisition and
 
blocking effects occur in human learning (Chapman, 1991;
 
Chapman & Robbins, 1990; Cramer, Weiss, Steigleder, &
 
Balling, 1985; Dickinson, Shanks, & Evenden, 1984; Shanks,
 
1985). Dickensonet al. (1984) asked subjects to judge the
 
extent to which pressing a key caused an effect to occur on
 
a computer screen. In the first stage of the study,
 
subjects Withessedttials oh which an alternative cue (A)
 
reliably predicted the effect. In the second stage, subjects
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performed the action (A) at the same time as cue (B)
 
occurred, and this combination of potential causes was
 
followed by the effect. Finally, subjects made judgements
 
about the causal relationship between the action and the
 
effect. Dickinson et al, found that the subject's judgements
 
were significantly reduced in the blocking condition
 
compared to the control condition in which cue (B) had
 
not been paired with the effect in the first stage.
 
Wasserman. In a more recent study, Wasserman (1990)
 
evaluated the parallels between animal associative learning
 
and human causal judgements by exploring the empirical
 
convergence of experimental manipulations in both domains.
 
Wasserman (1974) showed that in his autoshaping procedure
 
with pigeons and in his study with human causal judgements
 
(1990) the functional learning curves of human causal
 
ratings and pigeon keypecks over differeritial correlations
 
of AX-BX compounds demonstrated a similar pattern. In
 
Wasserman•s 1990 study, college students were asked to
 
judge the efficacy of three foods (peanuts, Shi'imP/ and
 
strawberries) in causing a patients's allergic reaction.
 
Food combinations Were varied along with the presence or
 
absence of an allergic reaction, Wasserman found that if a
 
subject can predict that shrimp/ for example, causes the
 
allergic reaction and peanuts do riot, then shrimp is given
 
causal priority. More specifically, shrimp and peanuts have
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different associative strengths depending upon the
 
differential correlation wiph the occurrence or
 
non-occurrence of illness. However, if a subject cannot
 
discriminate whether or not it is the shrimp or the peanuts
 
causing the allergic reaction, then both foods Ore given
 
causal priority. In essence, both foOds have^^^^^^^^t^^^ Same
 
associative strength. Gonsistent with contemporary learning
 
theory, Wasserman has demonstrated that subjects trying to
 
judge an effect from multiple causes use information about
 
the differential predictiveness of each of the stimuli.
 
The developments in the research mentioned above
 
indicates the possibility that models of elementary
 
associative learning may have explanatory value in human
 
causal judgements. Shanks (1987) and Wasserman (1990) have
 
suggested that historical observations or insights from some
 
of the earliest thinkers in behavior, more specifically,
 
David Hume can inform and inspire research and theory in
 
learning and causal judgments. In fact, according to Hume,
 
"a causal judgment is seen as reflecting no more than the
 
strength of the relevant association between the mental
 
representations of the cause and effect, with the principles
 
governing the attributions being those of associative
 
learning " (Shanks & Dickenson, 1987, p. 230).
 
In addition, what seems to be common among all the
 
studies previously mentioned is how the perceiver makes
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causal judgements given information about the differential
 
associative strength or probabilities of potential causes
 
and effects in the causal judgement task. Might not these
 
researchers be addressing the stimulus selection problem? I
 
am arguing that it is possible to address social causal
 
judgements in terms of the stimulus selection problem. That
 
is, given a particular social situation or context, what
 
rule or rules do observers use when attributing a cause to
 
an event? Stating the problem another way, what rules do
 
people use to attribute a particular cause to a particular
 
effect based upon the social context (e.g., the presence of
 
other people) in which these two stimuli are embedded?
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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
 
The present study is part of a program of research
 
designed to test several attribution hypotheses using
 
conditioning variables and analogous variables in social
 
psychology.
 
Technique of Theory Construction. Through the use of
 
analogy, a relatively well understood conditioning model is
 
used to guide the investigation of a less well understood
 
research area. In particular, analogies will be drawn
 
between classical conditioning independent and dependent
 
variables and variables assumed to be important in the
 
development of social causal judgements. Theoretically,
 
the empirical relationships holding among the variables
 
in the conditioning model should also hold among the
 
corresponding attribution variables (Oppenheimer, 1956;
 
Nagel, 1961).
 
Rules of Correspondence. Analogies drawn between
 
classical conditioning variables and variables assumed to be
 
important in attribution are as follows: Corresponding to a
 
conditioned stimulus (OS) is a discriminable Social
 
stimulus, such as a worker (A) or two workers (AX) or three
 
workers (ABX) /Rule 1). Corresponding to an unconditioned
 
stimulus (US) is a social stimulus, such as a company's
 
production level which elicits "striving for" responses
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(Staats, 1975) or our term for cause attribution,
 
invariance-seeking action, (Rule 2) with response so
 
elicited being analogous to an unconditioned response (UR)
 
(Rule 3). The conditioned form of the UR analog (speed, or
 
probability of invariance seeking action) corresponds to a
 
conditioned response (CR) (Rule 41. The number of CS-US
 
pairings (reinforced trials) corresponds to the number of CS
 
analog - US analog pairings an constitute attribution
 
acquisition trials (Rule_5). A trial on which the worker(s)
 
is not followed by the company's production level
 
constitutes an extinction trial (Rule 6). Corresponding to
 
an inhibition procedure is presenting two social CS
 
analogues (one previously paired with the effect of interest
 
(A) and one a novel stimulus (X) not followed by the effect
 
of interest; theoretically stimulus X becomes a conditioned
 
inhibitor of causal attribution (Rule 7). Corresponding to
 
a reinforced compound CS trial is an attribution trial where
 
two or more social stimuli, such as worker (A) and worker
 
(X) are paired with the company's production level (Rule 81.
 
Corresponding to the CS saliency is the saliency or
 
vividness of the CS analog (Rule 9^. The power of a social
 
stimulus, such as a company's production level in eliciting
 
invariance seeking action corresponds to the intensity
 
of the US (Rule lOV.
 
Although the rules developed here are illustrative
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rather than exhaustive, they are sufficiently detailed to
 
permit further theoretical develppment. The derivation of
 
acquisition and blocking effects follows from the
 
specification of a detailed mechanism for using the Rules of
 
Correspondence.
 
Rescorla-'Waqner Theorv. Arguably, the Rescorla-Wagner
 
model can address the stimulus selection problem in causal
 
attribution. More specifically, the Rescorla-Wagner model
 
assumes that the effectiveness of a US in increasing the
 
associative strength of a OS (VA) attenuates as the
 
signal yalue of the cue increases. Changes in associative
 
value of the CS (A VA) are determined by the difference
 
between the cue's current associative strength (VA) and the
 
theoretical asymptote of conditioning supportable by the US
 
(X.). As the difference between the associative strength of
 
a CS and theoretical asymptote of conditioning (X - VA)
 
decreases across conditioning trails, increases in the
 
associative strength of the CS will progressively diminish
 
resulting in a negatively accelerated learning curve
 
(acquisition). Stated another way, Rescorla and Wagner
 
(1972) suggest that changes in the associative strength
 
of a CS are not determined by the current strength of
 
that component stimulus alone but the total associative
 
strength of all cues present in the conditioning
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situation, including cpntext cues. Thus, the theory
 
predicts that conditioning of a neutral CS will be
 
affected by the comjibsite associative strengfth of all
 
background stimuli contiguous with the US, If the total
 
associative strength of all stimhli is at or near asymptote^
 
the US will be ineffective in conditioning any new cue
 
(blocking).
 
The Rescorla-Wagner Model (1973) assumes that the
 
associative strength of a compound (V AX) is a function
 
of the strengths of the component cues A and X. Rescorla
 
and Wagner also assumed that the associative strengths
 
combined additively: V AX = V A + V X, where the value of
 
the theoretical limit on conditioning sets limits on the
 
total strength of the compound. Prior Gohditioning to
 
stimulus A would be expected to block conditioning to
 
stimulus X if AX were reinforced together. Following the
 
logic presented above, if the asymptote of conditioning is
 
reached by reinforcing A then the difference between the
 
asymptote (X) and the associative strength of all stimuli
 
(VAX) present during conditioning will be zero (A. ^  VAX =
 
0). Hence, conditioning to X will be attenuated or blocked.
 
From an attribution perspective, prior association of an
 
event to a possible cause (A) reduces the degree to which
 
another plausible cause (X) could be advanced later even
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 though both "causes" appear with the event. This situation
 
mirrors Kamin's "blocking effect".
 
Hypothesis #1 - Acquisition Effects. Classical
 
conditioning in general, and Rescorla-Wagner theory in
 
particular, suggest that repeatedly pairing a neutral cue
 
(CS) with reinforcement (US) will contribute to the cue's
 
acquisition of associative strength. A negatively
 
accelerated increasing learning curve for the conditioned
 
response (CR) will result. Developing and manipulating
 
analogous attribution independent and dependent variables
 
should produce empirical relationships which are similar to
 
the conditioning relationships. Hence, we predict that
 
repeatedly pairing a single worker (A) with the company
 
meeting its productivity goal will result in the development
 
of stronger casual attributions to the worker. The
 
subject's causal attributions to the worker (invariance
 
seeking actions (ISA) = CR analog) should be evidenced by
 
mapping negatively accelerated ISA responses across
 
evaluation trials, (Rules of Correspondence 1 - 5).
 
Hypothesis #2 - Blocking Effects. The blocking effect
 
hypothesis is derived from the Cxpecta'feioh that GOnditioning
 
to a single antecedent stimulus takes place in a context
 
containing any number of other stimuli. Rescorla and Wagner
 
Idemonstrated a stimulus present during conditioning which
 
I already reliably signals the unconditioned stimulus, will
 
i \
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block or retard conditioning to a new stimulus. Hence, we
 
predict causal attributions to a target stimulus worker X
 
will be blocked if he is paired with the company meeting its
 
productivity goal in the presence of another worker A who
 
reliably predicts production goal attainment. In other
 
words, blocking should be evidenced by weaker casual
 
attributions to the worker X because another worker has a
 
history of being associated with the company meeting its
 
goal. (Rules of Correspondence 1-5 and 8).
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GENERAL METHOD
 
Subjects. Sixty female and male subjects were randomly
 
assigned to a blocking group (Group 1) or one of two control
 
groups (Groups 2 and 3). Subjects' gender was balanced
 
within each group. Subjects were recruited from
 
undergraduate psychology courses at California State
 
University, San Bernardino. All subjects were treated in
 
accordance with the Ethical Principles of the American
 
Psychological Association, one male and five female members
 
of the Social Learning Research Group served as
 
experimenters.
 
Masking Task. It has been argued that the subject's
 
awareness that their behavior is being recorded may distort
 
the validity of the research. Thus, in order to alleviate
 
reactivity biases, a slight deception regarding the true
 
nature of the experiment was necessary. The Conditioning
 
experiment was masked by describing it as a study
 
investigating a computerized employee evaluation
 
system. We instructed tlje subjodfe^^a^^ "In this
 
study we are interested in i^estihg the efficiency of a
 
computerized employee evaluation system. Your cooperation is
 
appreciated and necessary for examining the usefulness of
 
the automated program. In brder to test carefully the
 
effectiveness of the system, it will be necessary for you to
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assume the role of a production supervisor in a large
 
company." Additional instructions indicated that, "You
 
will be given information about three part-time employees,
 
Sam, Joe, and Ted and tlieir company's level of productivity.
 
After reviewing a monthly productivity report it will be
 
your responsibility as Sam, Joe, an<i Ted's supervisor to
 
evaluate their performance and how effective they were in
 
causing tbe company•s leVisl of productivity. "Sam, Joe and
 
Ted are college students and are only available to work
 
part-time. However, it is important to evaluate Sam, Joe,
 
and Ted carefully each month because they may be considered
 
for full time employment upon graduation."
 
In conditioning research the level of the US is
 
typically held constant except where magnitude of the US
 
effects are specifically tested. However, in social
 
learning research holding the level of productivity (US
 
analog) constant is vinrealistic. To maintain mundane
 
realism, slight variations in leVel of productivity were
 
used. Mora specifically, prbduction levels Gbmprised of
 
650, 700, and 750 Were indicated On a scale from 0 to 1000.
 
Expetimental Desiqri. In classical conditionirig a
 
discriminable antecedent stimulus is paired with a
 
discriminable conseguent stimulus. In the present study the
 
antecedent stimuli were fictional wbrker(s) named
 
Sam (blocking stimulus or A+), Joe (target stimulus or X+),
 
Ted (neutral stimulus or B-), and Sam and Joe presented
 
together (compound stimulus or AX+). The cpnsequent stimulus
 
was a fictional company meeting its productivity goal.
 
(See Appendix A.) The experiment can be described as a
 
Groups X Trials repeated measures design. The first
 
independent variable was the social context within which
 
the target worker, Joe (X), is paired with the cbmpany
 
meeting its productivity goal. Invariance seeking
 
action acquisition trials constituted the second
 
independent variable. The subject's strength of Causal
 
attributions to the target stimulus Joe (X+), (i.e.,
 
strength of invariance seeking action) constituted the
 
primary dependent variable. Other secondary dependent
 
variables included subject ratings on the following: 1) the
 
extent to which worker X was effective in causing the
 
company to meet its goal; 2) subject's confidence in his/her
 
rating of worker X's effectiveness is causing the company's
 
goal; 3) the effectiveness of worker X's fellow employees
 
causing the company goal to be met.
 
Apparatus and Materials. Previous research has
 
demonstrated the utility of using a computer to administer
 
the stimulus material when examining causal relationships
 
(See Dickinson, Shanks, & Evenden 1984; Shanks & Dickinson,
 
1987; Shanks, 1987,1988). Thus, the subject module was
 
controlled using an IBM 386 PC and the software application
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used was Micro experimental Language (MEL) version 120. This
 
application directed the presentation of the instructions,
 
the antecedent and consequent stimuli, manipulanda, and the
 
employee evaluation scale (EES).
 
On the computer Subject module a key pad numbered 0 to
 
100 allowed the subjects to rate the worker(s) using a 3
 
item employee evaluation scale (EES). The EES was designed
 
to measure worker effectiveness following the presentation
 
of the antecedent and consequent stimulus on each
 
conditioning trial. For purposes of clarity, all EES
 
questions were anchored with a value of 0 indicating no
 
attribute to a value of 100 which equals the attribute. The
 
Ells contained three items which were as follows: 1) "Given
 
all the information you have received, on the scale below
 
indicate THE EXTENT TO WHICH SAM AND JOE WERE EFFECTIVE in
 
causing the company's level of PRODUCTIVITY." anchored with
 
the Phrases totallv ineffective and totallv effective; 2)
 
"HOW CONFIDENT ARE YOU ABOUT YOUR RATING OF SAM AND JOE as
 
being effective in causing the company's level of
 
productivity." anchored with no confidence to complete
 
confidence; 3) "Given all of the information you have
 
received, indicate THE EXTENT TO WHICH SAM AND JOE'S FELLOW
 
WORKERS ARE EFFECTIVE in causing the company's level of
 
productivity." anchored with totallv ineffective to totally
 
effective.
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Note: the above items are examples of questions
 
that were presented when the antecedent stimulus is a
 
compound stimulus or presents two workers Sam and Joe (AX).
 
However, when the antecedent stimulus presents one worker,
 
Sam (A+), Joe (X+), or Ted (B-) the EES will ask questions
 
pertaining to the worker that is viewed on that particular
 
trial. The six test trials evaluating the target worker Joe
 
(X+) are of particular importance for testing the
 
hypothesis.
 
Procedure. Upon entering the laboratory, subjects were
 
asked to read and sign a consent form (see Appendix B).
 
The experimenter then asked the subjects to sit in front
 
of the subject module while s/he activates the MEL program.
 
At the beginning of the program subjects received
 
instructions pertaining to one of the three treatment
 
conditions (see Appendix C). Following the instructions the
 
antecedent stimulus (the workers) appeared for 5 seconds
 
on the left side of the computer monitor. After the
 
antecedent stimulus had been illuminated for 5 seconds, the
 
consequent stimulus was presented and illuminated for 10
 
seconds on the right side of the computer monitor, with both
 
the antecedent and consequent stimulus extinguishing
 
together after 10 seconds. The entire computer monitor then
 
went blank, and item one from the EES appeared for 15
 
seconds. Subjects were asked to respond to the item
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using a computer keypad. After the subject responded
 
evaluation item one went off and item two then appeared on
 
for 15 seconds. This sequence was repeated, in turn,
 
for the remaining third item. After the subjects
 
responded to item three the program recycled to the
 
antecedent stimulus. The cycle was repeated 18 times in
 
Group 1, 12 times in Group 2, and 18 times in Group 3. After
 
the subjects completed the sequence of cycles they were
 
thoroughly debriefed and given the opportunity to have all
 
of their questions answered (see Appendix D).
 
Group 1 - Blocking (A+/AX+). Subjects were exposed
 
to the antecedent and consequent stimuli a total of 18
 
times. All 18 trials presented to the subjects were randomly
 
interspersed and consisted of six blocking stimuli (A+) or
 
(worker Sam trials), and six compound stimuli (AX+) or
 
(workers Sam and Joe trials), followed by six target stimuli
 
(X+) or (worker Joe alone trials). Each antecedent stimulus
 
was followed by the consequent stimulus or company goal
 
production level. After each antecedent and consequent
 
stimulus presentation, the subjects responded to the EES.
 
Group 2 - Control fAX+V. Subjects in Group 2 were
 
treated similarly to subjects in Group 1 except the
 
antecedent and consequent stimuli Were presented a total
 
of 12 times. Six of the trials presented were compound
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stimuli, or Sam and Joe paired with the company meeting
 
the production goal (AX+). Following thereafter were six
 
target stimuli or test trials with the worker Jpe paired
 
with company meeting the production goal (X+). Because
 
blocking is a between groups phenomenon, groups 2 and 3
 
differs from group 1, such that, there was no exposure to
 
the blocking stimulus, or no (A+) trials were presented.
 
Group 3 - Control (B-/hX+ Control). Group 3 served
 
as a control group for the amount of information provided
 
the subjects in Group 1. As in Group 1 the antecedent and
 
consequent stimulus were presented a total of 18 times.
 
However, six non reinforced or neutral trials presented the
 
worker Ted (B-) paired with no company production report.
 
Another six trials presented the compound stimuli or workers
 
Sam and Joe (AX+) paired with the,company meeting its
 
production goal. The remaining six trials were test trials,
 
and presented the target worker Joe (X+j paired with
 
the company meeting its production goal.. The twelve trials
 
including the neutral conditipning trials (B^) and the
 
compound conditioning trials (AX+) were randomly
 
interspersed, followed by six test trials, or six (X+)
 
trials. No blocking stimuli or (A+) trials were presented.
 
Note: For the blocking (A+)V compound (AX+), and target
 
stimuli (X+) conditions described for each group, the levels
 
of production (i.e. 650, 700, 750) were presented twice
 
3.9' , ■ 
in a randomized order.
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RESULTS
 
The analyses focused on the subjects* ratings of each
 
"employees" causal strength and the subjects* confidence in
 
their causal judgement. Recall that both dependent
 
variables were measured on a 0 to 100 point scale across a
 
series of test trials. In order to examine the hypothesized
 
acquisition effects, a simple repeated measures was
 
performed on causal ratings provided by subjects in groups 1
 
and 3. And, to examine blocking effects, subjects* causal
 
ratings of the target stimulus X (the worker named Joe),
 
were examined by performing a 3 groups by 6 trials repeated
 
measures ANOVA.
 
Causal Confidence Ratings. The validity of the primary
 
measure, subjects* ratings of Worker causal strength, is
 
enhanced if it can be demonstrated that the ratings are not
 
related to subjects* confidence in making the ratings.
 
Hence, the confidence variable was analyzed first in order
 
to eliminate possible confounds in subjects* causal
 
judgements. Prior causal attribution research (Shanks &
 
Dickinson, 1987) argued that the subjects* confidence in
 
their judgement must be consistent regardless of
 
experimental group assignment. If this consistency is not
 
evident then their causal judgements may be an artifact of
 
the judgement task and not the conditioning procedures.
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 Therefore subjects' are expected to be equally confident in
 
their estimates of either high or low worker causal
 
strength.
 
A 3 X 6 (Groups X Trials) repeated measures ANOVA
 
was performed on subjects' confidence ratings of their
 
estimates of the worker Joe's causal strength. Recall
 
that the subjects' ratings of the worker Joe's causal
 
strength is the primary variable for examining blocking
 
effects. The group, trials, and interaction effects,
 
were not statistically reliable. Groups, F (2,57) =
 
< 1, p > .05, Trials, F (5,285) = < 1, E > .05, C X T,
 
F (10,285) = 1.27, p > .05. As expected these results
 
indicate that the subjects' confidence ratings were not
 
affected by the experimental manipulations. Hence, variation
 
in causal strength ratings were presumed to be due to the
 
conditioning phenomena.
 
Acauisition/US Intensitv. Usually, different groups in
 
a conditioning experiment begin at a similar low level of
 
performance, with differences in performance developing over
 
the course of trials. Therefore, as a general rule, tests
 
for rank order differences and differences in causal
 
judgement ratings of various experimental groups are made
 
late in learning over a block of the last few trials. In
 
testing acquisition a simple repeated measures analysis was
 
performed on the causal judgements for the blocking (A+) and
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neutral stimuli (B-), or for workers Sam and Ted, in Groups
 
1 and 3, respectively. causal judgement to the blocking
 
stimulus (A+) were significantly different across the
 
trials, F (5,95) = 2.98, p < .02. As expected, simple
 
repeated measures performed on the neutral stimulus (B-)
 
across the trials did not reveal a significant effect F
 
(5,95) = 1.93 E > .05.
 
An inspection of the blocking stimulus (A+) or worker
 
Sam's causal rating mean scores revealed that subjects' were
 
not responding as expected across the six repeated trials.
 
That is, no increasing function (i.e., learning curve) was
 
observed. At first glance, subjects appeared to be
 
responding in a haphazard fashion. However, upon closer
 
post hoc inspection the subjects were responding in a
 
predictable manner. Recall that as part of the masking
 
task, subjects rated the worker after being provided
 
information about his level of production. Variation in the
 
worker's level of monthly production was necessary in order
 
to maintain mundane realism of the supervisor-worker masking
 
task. When the means of the subjects' causal judgement
 
scores were averaged in blocks of 2 trials pertaining to
 
different levels of production (levels of US intensity) the
 
data showed a familiar learning effect. (See Figure 1). As
 
the subjects were exposed to increasing levels of production
 
(US intensity) their averaged causal ratings increased
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correspondingly Pairwise comparisons, using a pooled error
 
term were performed on blocks of 2 levels of intensity for
 
subjects in Group 1. No differences were observed between
 
blocks of 2 trials at intensity levels 650 and 700, (M =
 
69.80 vs M = 73.45), t(285) = 1.46, £ > .05; and between
 
levels 700 and 750, (M =73.45 vs M = 76.34), t(285) = 1.52,
 
P > .05. However, a significant range effect was observed
 
when the lowest intensity, 650, was compared to the highest
 
intensity, 750, (M = 69.80 vs 76.34), t(285) = 4.22, p <
 
.05. As expected, in the no report condition (B-) mean
 
causal ratings were lower compared to the ratings for all
 
three levels of production paired with the single worker in
 
Group 1. No direct statistical comparisons were performed
 
because the A+ means are based on two trials of rating
 
information, whereas, the information for the B- trials
 
represent six test trials.
 
Blocking. Previous learning research has demonstrated
 
that Blocking is a between groups phenomenon. Thus, in
 
order to examine Blocking effects a 3 x 6 (Groups X
 
Trials) Manova was performed on subjects' causal ratings of
 
the target worker X. The groups were not statistically
 
reliable, condition F (2, 57) = < 1, p > .05, However, the
 
trials and C X T were significantly different. Trials, F (5,
 
285) = 7.17 p < .05; C XT, F (10, 285) = 6.46 p < .05.
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In examining worker (Joe) or target (X+) means by group
 
in blocks of two trails across production levels revealed a
 
systematic trend. As the US or intensity level increased,
 
the subjects causal ratings increased correspondingly (See
 
Figure 2).
 
A pairwise comparison (one-tail) was performed on the
 
blocks of trials in Groups 1-3 over the three levels of
 
production. No differences between the groups at each
 
intensity was observed, p > 05.
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DISCUSSION
 
Isolating critical variables in earlier attribution
 
research was essential in developing a foundation from
 
which further hypothesis were to iDe derived. However, the
 
philosophy born from the British Associationist era was
 
the adopted underpinnings of earlier attribution research
 
and has been slow to change with more contemporary views of
 
associationism. For example, earlier attribution principles
 
argued that an effect is attributed (causal judgement) to
 
one of its possible causes with which, over time, it
 
covaries. The present research attempted to extend this
 
concept by examining how social causal judgements acquire
 
strength resulting from repeated presentations of events.
 
This research adopts a more current approach regarding the
 
mechanisms of associationism underlying social causal
 
judgements by employing contemporary learning theory and
 
paradigms. In fact. Shanks and Dickenson (1987) argued
 
that the only area of psychdlogy that has offered an
 
associative account of a process sensitive to causality is
 
that of conditioning (p. 230). Based upon contemporary
 
conditioning models, we generated hypotheses to
 
test acquisition and blocking effects in social causal
 
judgements and/or attributions.
 
The objective of the present research was to use a
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contemporary learning model to experimentally test
 
hypotheses in attribution using conditioning variables and
 
analogous variables in social psychology. As part of a
 
programmatic approach in examining human social causal
 
judgements, the present study extended current thinking on
 
complex attributional processes by taking into account the
 
role of situational variables or context within which human
 
causal judgements are made. Historically, causal
 
attribution research has provided only limited explanations
 
for how the individual renders a causal judgement when
 
multiple causes are present. In addition, previous
 
attribution research has utilized descriptive research
 
designs whereby subjects are processing causal judgements in
 
an all-or-none fashion. The present study examined how
 
causal judgements regarding multiple plausible causes are
 
developed over time.
 
Causal Confidence Ratings. Previous research (Shanks
 
and Dickenson, 1987) illuistrated the importance of
 
demonstrating that the results obtained in learning-analog
 
studies (acquisition) should not be an artifact of the
 
rating procedure. They argued that the rating scale in
 
conditioning researchmay encourage subjects to confound
 
their assessment of causality with some other judgement
 
feature of the task when making the rating. For example,
 
the subjects' confidence in making a particular rating may
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confound their judgments of causality. In order to test for
 
this possible confound, the present research examined
 
confidence ratings on a 0 to 100 point scale with all
 
stimulus presentations. Consistent with our prediction,
 
subjects' confidence ratings on the target stimulus (worker
 
Joe's) causal strength did not vary significantly as a
 
function of different group manipulations. Thus, subjects
 
were capable of making orderly judgements of confidence
 
during the causal rating task. Ruling out this potential
 
confound. Shanks and Dickenson argued, provides support for
 
an associative learning model of causal judgment strength.
 
Acquisition Effects. When a subject is exposed to a
 
conditioning procedure, conditioned responses do not
 
typically start occurring at full strength, but, begin at a
 
lower level of strength and progressively increase in
 
strength until an asymptotic level is reached (acquisition).
 
The present study examined acquisition effects by pairing a
 
single worker with information regarding a company's level
 
of goal production over repeated trials. Measuring the
 
strength of the conditioned response was assessed using the
 
subjects' causal strength ratings for workers Sam (A+ =
 
rewarded trials) and Ted (B- = non rewarded trials).
 
Although causal ratings for the worker (A+) were
 
significant across six trials in causal strength for Group
 
1, visual inspection of the causal strength means did not
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reveal the anticipated negatively accelerated acquisition
 
curve. However, when the worker (A+) means were averaged in
 
blocks of two trials for each specific goal production level
 
predictable learning effects were evidenced. As the level
 
of production increased from 650 to 750, subjects causal
 
judgement scores increased correspondingly and were higher
 
than causal judgements made to the worker (B-) paired with
 
no reinforcement (no information about the company's
 
production level). Such an effect would be expected based on
 
the assumption that changes in production levels were
 
analogous to changes in the intensity or magnitude of a
 
learning unconditioned stimulus (see Rule of Correspondence
 
#10). The subjects were responding to the intensity of the
 
US or the company's level of production. The more intense
 
the US (company goal), the higher the mean causal priority
 
was given to the worker (See Figure 1).
 
The present study provided subjects with different
 
information on production levels in order to establish
 
mundane realism. Such a procedure would be unnecessary when
 
using non-human subjects in a classical conditioning
 
paradigmi However, human subjects would become suspicious
 
if the company's production level remained constant across
 
the evaluation cycles. We did not anticipate that the
 
subjects wouldl attend to only slight increments and
 
decrements in the (US) or company production level. In
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retrospect, the subjects took very seriously the
 
instructional set and the masking task. They played their
 
role as supervisors extremely well. And, although the
 
acquisition data did not conform to expectations the results
 
are not without logic;
 
Intensity effects like those observed in Figure 1
 
indicate that a simple contiguity model for causal
 
attribution could not provide a complete explanation. If the
 
pairing of a worker (CS) and a company production level (US)
 
is all that is required for the development of causal
 
attribution strength then no production level intensity
 
effects would be expected. Traditional social psychological
 
or "rule governed" explanations describing causal priorities
 
like Kellev's covariation principle, also do not easily
 
explain intensity effects. Based upon the present results,
 
it appears that subjects are evaluating the informativeness
 
of stimuli and are making selective causal judgements based
 
upon that information. The above discussion is admittedly
 
post hoc, but, Williams (1994) has demonstrated that varying
 
the contingency between CS and US, and thus challenging the
 
simple contiguity approach in the evaluation of human
 
causal judgements, produces systematic outcomes.
 
Blocking Effects. In Group 1 subjects were expected to
 
give lower causal ratings to the target worker (Joe) because
 
of their prior experience with another worker (Sam) who was
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a reliable predictor of the company•s production level.
 
Learning psychologists argue that since antecedent stimulus
 
or a first worker already reliable predicts the outcome, the
 
target stimulus or in the present case a second worker will
 
become redundant (e.g. Wagner & Rescorla, 1972).
 
Therefore, the worker which initially was associated with
 
the outcome (e.g. company level of production) will be given
 
higher causal priority than a second worker although paired
 
with the same outcome (e.g. level of production) because
 
this information is redundant. Hence, causal attributions to
 
the second worker are expected to be blocked. In the
 
present research blocking effects were not observed.
 
However, in the present research the target worker was not
 
redundant. Because of the necessary changes in the
 
company's level of production the second worker actually
 
predicted different outcomes. Arguably, such a procedure is
 
not appropriate for studying blocking. In fact, when a
 
target stimulus is paired with an increase in the US
 
strength (higher company production level) a phenomenon know
 
as unblocking can be expected. Unblocking would be expected
 
to result in stronger, not weaker, causal attribution to the
 
target worker. Therefore, the procedure designed to produce
 
mundane realism may have produced the unexpected outcomes.
 
Boundary Conditions. In general, the results from
 
theory-generated research, and in particular, the results
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from the present study, should be interpreted within a
 
narrow range of conditions (Logan, 1959). The general
 
method from the present study serves as an explicit
 
Statement for some of the boundary conditions, particularly
 
in regard to the discrete-trials procedure, the conditioning
 
of a single response, the control of competing responses,
 
and the choice of dependent variable. Typically, social
 
psychological attribution research regarding the strength of
 
human causal judgments utilize descriptive events of social
 
action rather than presenting information about social
 
behavior over time. For example, subjects are given a
 
descriptive account of some social action (like a vignette)
 
and then asked to make an attribution "all-or-none" based
 
upon the information from this single observation. However,
 
the present study, which was concerned with conditioning and
 
contextual variables in social causal attributions, examined
 
how multiple presentations of antecedent and consequent
 
stimuli effect social causal judgements over time. The
 
potential context effects suggested here may generalize only
 
to situations where information is presented repeatedly
 
rather than to descriptive accounts of social action.
 
However, the conditioning strategy tested and reported on
 
here have a broader application than the unusual
 
experimental procedure seems to imply. For example,
 
conditioning analogies from both instrumental and Pavlovian
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learning models have successfully been used to study a
 
variety of social phenomena: altruism (Weiss, Buchanan,
 
Alstatt, & Lombardo 1971); attitudes (Weiss, 1962);
 
attraction (Cramer, Weiss, Steigleder, & Balling, 1985);
 
competition (Steigleder, Weiss, Cramer, & Feinberg, 1978);
 
and male sex role action (Cramer, Lutz, Bartell, Dragna, &
 
Helzer, 1989). Rather than appealing to only a narrow range
 
of learning phenomena, the research strategy described here
 
may serve to strengthen and extend previous findings
 
regarding human causal judgements.
 
Research boundary conditions can also be established by
 
recognizing disanalogies between important learning
 
variables and theoretical analogous social variables. For
 
example, in learning psychology conditioning is presumed to
 
follow from the use of neutral discriminable antecedent
 
stimuli. We know that conditioning is retarded when
 
putative conditioned stimuli are familiar to the subject by
 
preexposure or by a preexisting conditioning history. The
 
present study assumed that the human employees about which
 
the subject had only scant knowledge were analogous to
 
disCriminable neutral antecedent stimuli in conditioning
 
research. However, the present results argue that such an
 
assumption may not be valid. The argument is based upon
 
data provided by subjects in Group 3 (i.e. subjects
 
receiving non reinforced or B- trials). Theoretically, the
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strength of causal attributions to a worker not paired with
 
company production irtformation should not appreciably
 
increase. In other words, presenting an antecedent stimulus
 
without presenting an effect should not result in causal
 
attributions to the antecedent stimulus. In Group 3,
 
however, causal judgement strength averaged a mean score of
 
52.60 on a 100 point scale. Arguably, human or human
 
representations (employees) do not serve as neutral
 
antecedent stimuli. That is, humans are "at cause" by being
 
"at cause", and estimates of their contribution to an effect
 
can vary, but, will not be negligible.
 
Another implication of the humans are "at cause"
 
phenomenon is that conditioning of causal attributions may
 
not begin at or near zero in strength. Recall that in
 
Group 1 and 2, subjects received a series of worker
 
productivity pairings and were measured for their estimates
 
Of causal strength following each pairing. The average
 
causal judgements in Group 1, for example, ranged between
 
60.80 to 76.34 for blocks of two trials. In no instance did
 
the subjects give causal judgement ratings averaging at or
 
near zero. In fact, the causal strength rating presented in
 
Figure 1 may represent only increases from an unanticipated
 
baseline of approximately 50. The baseline of 50 is derived
 
from information provided by subjects in Group 3 (B-). The
 
present study's acquisition and blocking effects may have
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been negatively effected by such a restricted range in
 
conditionable causal judgeinent strength.
 
Implications For Future Research. Mapping learning
 
research variables to social analogues in human causal
 
judgements have yielded predictable outcomes (See William,
 
1994; Kuhn, 1993). However, in the present study the
 
predicted learning phenomenon, acquisition and blocking,
 
were not achieved, not because the variables were
 
not tightly drawn (see Rules of Correspondence), but,
 
because unanticipated effects may have developed as a
 
function of the change in "saliency" of the US, and/or the
 
company production goal always being met. Recall that in
 
the present study subjects received information indicating
 
that the company's production goal was always exceeded.
 
They also received information indicating that the
 
particular level of production varied across evaluation
 
periods. The rationale for the latter information
 
was to maintain mundane realism of the worker-supervisor
 
masking task. In retrospect, variation in the production
 
level information may have been important for making causal
 
judgements because the company's production goal was always
 
exceeded. Goal information, because it was not held
 
constant, could not be used by the subjects for evaluation
 
of the target worker, rather, the subjects were thoughtfully
 
interpreting the production variations as a basis for causal
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judgement. This behavior on the part of the subjects would
 
undermine the theoretical necessity of holding the US
 
constant and observing the blocking effect. Further
 
research must resolve the issues surrounding variation in
 
the production effects or other US analogs.
 
Because humans may be "at cause" or are adept at
 
discriminating between slight variations of stimuli
 
in their environment, the interspersed trials procedure
 
that the present research utilized may not have been the
 
most appropriate protocol. Recall that earlier in the
 
blocking procedure, subjects were presented with six trials
 
of a single CS interspersed with 6 trials with a compound
 
CS, followed by six trials of a single worker CS which
 
served as a test for measuring causal judgement strength. As
 
the results indicated, subjects who where exposed to the
 
blocking group did not "block" or attenuate their causal
 
judgement scores to the (novel) single worker in the
 
compound. In essence, the (novel) single worker did not
 
prove to be "redundant", but, on the different trials
 
predicted a new outcome. Further research may consider using
 
a phase conditioning procedure (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972)
 
where each type of single stimulus and compound stimulus are
 
grouped and presented in distinct phases. Utilizing this
 
procedure coupled with eliminating the arbitrary goal may in
 
fact be one solution for observing predictable effects in
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acquisition and blocking of social causal judgement.
 
Clinical Applications. The influence of how multiple
 
causes affect causal judgements over time may be applied to
 
several social situations wheire human social exchange is
 
implied in the rendering of some causaT attributions. More
 
specifically, any therapeutic approach and/or client-

therapist relationship may be affected by how contextual
 
variables are conditioned over time. For example, William
 
(1994) demonstrated that multiple causes influencing causal
 
judgements may follow from contemporary learning principles
 
like acquisition and contingency (base-rate) effects.
 
William suggested that "contingency effects" may
 
parallel the client therapeutic relationship, such that
 
the clinician's assessment (cause judgement) for a
 
particular client may be biased when the client is present
 
in an individual therapy session vs when the client is in a
 
group therapeutic situation. Supporting Williams'
 
point of view, Cline (1985) has argued that there is no
 
general review of the impact of the clinical situation on
 
clinical judgement, and has suggested that whether a client
 
is interviewed alone or in his/her family group will
 
significantly influence the interviewer's evaluation of
 
his/her client.
 
Blocking of social causal judgements may be evidenced
 
in any therapeutic setting as well. Psychiatric patients
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are at risk for suicide 3 to 12 times greater than that of
 
non-patients. It has been reported that the degree of risk
 
varies according to age, sex, diagnosis, and inpatient or
 
outpatient status. More specifically, in a closed
 
psychiatric facility, where patients are monitored
 
routinely, suicides are reported more often among patients
 
diagnosed with depression than individuals diagnosed with
 
psychosis (Kaplan & Sadock/ 1991). If there is no
 
difference in documented patient observation records on the
 
unit, then, why should such differential suicide rates be
 
evidenced? It may be possible that "blocking" of patient
 
observations is occurring. In other words, the inpatient
 
staff who monitors the activities of psychiatric patients
 
may be making differential observation rounds (or
 
attributions) because of the saliency of the diagnosis.
 
For example, let's say a psychotic suicidal individual (A+)
 
is brought to a psychiatric hospital and is placed on
 
routine observation rounds every fifteen minutes. Then,
 
later in time, a depressed individual (X+) is also admitted
 
to the hospital and placed on routine observations (AX+).
 
Previous expetrience and threat to injury with the psychotic
 
individual will alert health care professionals to observe
 
the patient more closely than the depressed individual
 
because the psychotic individual is the most salient
 
stimulus. Attributions of suicidality to the depressed
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person is "bloclced" because the depressed persons does not
 
predict any threat (US). Hence, causal judgements
 
(perceived threat) to the depressed individual is "blocked",
 
therefore, the depressed person may go unnoticed and hence
 
is more likely to successfully attempt suicide in a
 
psychiatric facility.
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APPENDIX A
 
Antecedent and Consequent Stimuli
 
Compound stimulus Sam and Joe (AX+) and company production
 
report.
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Appendix A (cont'd)
 
Antecedent and Gonseauent Stimuli
 
Blocking Stimulus Sam (A+) alone and company production
 
report.
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Appendix A (cont'd)
 
Antecedent and Consequent Stimuli
 
Target stimulus Joe (X+) alone and company productidn
 
report.;V
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Appendix A (cont'd)
 
Antecedent and Consequent Stimuli
 
Neutral stimulus Ted (B-) and no company production report.
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APPENDIX B
 
Consent Form
 
EMPLOYEE EVALUATION SYSTEM
 
I am volunteering to participate as a subject in this study.
 
I understand that the purpose of this study is to test the
 
efficiency of a computerized employee evaluation system. I
 
understand that the information will be presented to me via
 
a computer monitor and that I will be asked to assume the
 
role of a production supervisor in a large company.
 
I understand that my name will NOT be included in the
 
experiment itself and that my anonymity will be maintained
 
at all times. I also understand that my participation in
 
this study is voluntary and that I may refuse to answer any
 
questions at any time. I also understand that I may
 
withdraw from this study at any time without penalty or
 
prejudice. I also understand that any questions I may have
 
regarding this study will be answered.
 
I understand that all the information collected in this
 
study will be treated as confidential with no details about
 
my responses released to anyone outside the research staff
 
without my separate and specific written consent.
 
I understand that I may derive no specific benefit from
 
participation in this study, except perhaps from feeling
 
that I have contributed to the development of psychological
 
knowledge.
 
I hereby allow this research group to publish the results of
 
this study in which I am participating, with the provision
 
that my name and/or other identifying information be
 
withheld.
 
This study is being conducted by psychology students under
 
the supervision of Dr. Robert Cramer, PS-211, extension
 
5576. I understand that if I have any questions or concerns
 
about the study or the informed consent process I may also
 
contact the Psychology Department Human Subjects Review
 
Board at CSUSB.
 
Participants Signature; Date_
 
Participants Name (Printed) '
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APPENDIX C
 
Instructions for Group 1
 
Experimenter Note:
 
(6 A+, 6 AX+, 6X+ Blocking group)
 
Practice Script
 
Read when worker(s) appear: "On the left side of the screen
 
will be a picture representing one part-time employee, Sam
 
or Joe, or two part-time employees Sam and Joe."
 
Read when the graph appears: "On the right side of the
 
screen is a graph depicting the company's monthly
 
productivity."
 
"Are there any questions?"
 
Have subjects press 1 to continue.
 
Note: A set of instructions appears for the subjects to
 
read. Read it aloud as the subjects follow along on the
 
computer.
 
"Following each monthly productivity report you will be
 
asked to rate the employees on their OVERALL performance on
 
a "0 to iOO" point scale. After reading each item carefully
 
please respond by using the numeric keypad on the right side
 
of the keyboard. After entering any number between "0 to
 
100" (including 100) please wait for the next evaluation
 
item to appear."
 
(Wait until screen changes to first evaluation item)
 
Read: "After reading the item for practice, please press 50
 
and wait for the next evaluation item to appear"
 
(Wait until screen changes to second evaluation item)
 
Read: "Please answer 111 for this item. This is to
 
demonstrate what will happen if you enter a number over 100.
 
If this warning appears any time during the evaluation
 
cycle, put in the corrected number and wait for the next
 
screen to appear. Please do not enter any number for the
 
last question during this practice session."
 
Note: when you are ready to begin, please press 1.
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Appendix C (cont'd)
 
Instructions for Group 2
 
Experimenter Note:
 
(6 AX+, 6X+ Control group 2)
 
Practice Script
 
Read when worker(s)appear: "On the left side of the
 
screen will be a picture representing either two part-

time employees, Sam and Joe or one part-time employee
 
Joe."
 
Read when the graph appears: "On the right side of the
 
screen is a graph depicting the company•s monthly
 
productivity."
 
"Are there any questions?"
 
Have subjects press 1 to continue.
 
Note: A set of instructions appears for the subjects to
 
read. Read it aloud as the subjects follow along on the
 
computer.
 
"Following each monthly productivity report you will be
 
asked to rate the employees on their OVERALL performance on
 
a "0 to 100" point scale. After reading each item carefully
 
please respond by using the numeric keypad on the right side
 
of the keyboard. After entering any number between "0 to
 
100" (including 100) please wait for the next evaluation
 
item to appear."
 
(Wait until screen changes to first evaluation item)
 
Read: "After reading the item for practice, please press 50
 
and wait for the next evaluation item to appear"
 
(Wait until screen changes to second evaluation item)
 
Read: "Please answer 111 for this item. This is to
 
demonstrate what will happen if you enter a number over 100.
 
If this warning appears any time during the evaluation
 
cycle, put in the corrected number and wait for the next
 
screen to appear. Please do not enter any number for the
 
last question during this practice session."
 
Note: When you are ready to begin, please press 1.
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Appendix C (cont'd)
 
Instructions for Group 3
 
Experimenter Note:
 
(6 B-, 6 AX+, 6 X+, control group 3)
 
Practice Script
 
Read when worker(s) appear: "On the left side of the screen
 
wiir be a picture representing part-time employees, Joe or
 
Ted or two part-time employees Sam and Joe."
 
Read when the graph appears: "On the right side of the
 
screen is a graph depicting the company's monthly
 
productivity. During an evaluation cycle it is possible
 
a blank graph would appear when no report was required. If
 
this occurs it is important that you continue to rate the
 
employees on their OVERALL performance."
 
"Are there any questions?"
 
Have subjects press 1 to continue.
 
Note: A set of instructions appears for the subjects to
 
read. Read it aloud as the subjects follow along on the
 
computer.
 
"Following each monthly productivity report you will be
 
asked to rate the employees on their OVERALL performance on
 
a "0 to 100" point scale. After reading each item
 
carefully please respond by using the numeric keypad on the
 
right side of the keyboard. After entering any number
 
between "0 to 100" (including 100) please wait for the next
 
evaluation item to appear."
 
(Wait until screen changes to first evaluation item)
 
Read: "After reading the item for practice, please press 50
 
and wait for the next evaluation item to appear"
 
(Wait until screen changes to second evaluation item)
 
Read: "Please answer 111 for this item. This is to
 
demonstrate what will happen if you enter a number over 100.
 
If this warning appears any time during the evaluation
 
cycle, put in the corrected number and wait for the next
 
screen to appear. Please do not enter any number for the
 
last question during this practice session."
 
Note: When you are ready to begin, please press 1.
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APPENDIX D
 
Debriefing Statement
 
The present study is part of a series of research
 
projects designed to investigate human social causal
 
judgments. Unfortunately> in order to adequately investigate
 
this social phenomenon a small deception of the subjects was
 
necessary. Rather than directly asking questions concerning
 
your social causal judgments, we explained the study as
 
testing the efficiency of a computerized Employee Evaluation
 
System. The company, its employees, and the evaluation
 
system were fictitious. We apologize for this deception,
 
however if we had asked directly about your causal judgments
 
your responses may have been effected.
 
(Stop. Are there any questions?)
 
It is our sincere hope that the necessity for deception
 
is understood. It is important for the completion of this
 
study that you do not speak with other students on campus
 
about your experience here today. If other potential
 
subjects are aware of the purpose of the experiment, the
 
results of the study might be compromised.
 
The present study conforms to the ethical principles
 
established by the American Psychological Association. We
 
are interested in obtaining your comments or reaction
 
regarding your participation in our experiment. This
 
information would serve as a basis for checking and
 
evaluating the quality and care with which our research is
 
conducted. Please feel free to comment or ask questions. For
 
results concerning the present study contact Dr. Robert
 
Cramer, at (909) 880-5576.
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